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This study examines the effects of using the internal audit function as a training ground
for management and fraud magnitude on internal auditor fraud reporting decisions. Using a 2x2
between-participants experiment, the current study manipulates the use of the internal audit
function as a management training ground (used as a training ground vs. not used as a training
ground) and fraud magnitude (large fraud, defined as 30 percent of net income vs. small fraud,
defined as one percent of net income). The results indicate that internal auditors may be less
likely to report a fraud to their superior when the internal auditors are being groomed for
management positions. No effect is found for fraud magnitude, as respondents indicated a similar
willingness to report small frauds as large frauds. These findings contribute to the
whistleblowing literature and the internal audit objectivity literature by demonstrating that
undesirable repercussions associated with using the internal audit function as a management
training ground can extend to the internal auditor fraud reporting decision.

I. INTRODUCTION

Since the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), there has been a resurgence in demand for
the corporate internal audit function. Audit committees have increased their reliance on internal
auditors to notify them about the financial and operating condition of firms (Oxner and Oxner
2006). Often charged with both consulting and compliance roles, internal auditors have a
difficult set of responsibilities to perform. A chief concern regarding internal auditors’ dual roles
is objectivity, and specifically whether internal auditors are able to be objective given their often
conflicting roles. Objectivity refers to an internal auditor’s ability to fairly assess a situation
without being unduly influenced by personal interests or the interests of others (IIA 2009).
Internal auditors are mandated to be objective and independent (IIA 2013a; IIA 2009). However,
situational factors often make objectivity and independence difficult to achieve. For example,
most internal auditors in the U.S. are eligible to participate in incentive-based compensation
plans, such as stock ownership or performance-based bonuses (DeZoort, Houston, and Reisch
2000; Dickens and O’Reilly 2009). These sorts of pressures can reduce internal auditor
objectivity (Schneider 2003) and incentivize internal auditors to “bias their audit evaluations to
maximize their personal wealth by maximizing reported company performance” (DeZoort,
Houston, and Peters 2001, 261).
The current study examines one such pressure: using the internal audit function as a
management training ground (MTG). MTG refers to a procedure in which individuals are hired
into or transferred into the internal audit department for a short term before being promoted to a
management position. The practice of using the internal audit function as a MTG has become
very common in recent years (Abbott, Parker, and Peters 2010; Oxner and Oxner 2006; Goodwin
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and Yeo 2001) as internal audit is often viewed as a “fishing pond full of high potential” (Sarens
and de Beelde 2006, 234). Specifically, the current study examines the effects of using internal
audit as a MTG on fraud reporting. Internal auditors are arguably in the ideal position to deter
and detect fraud (Hillison, Pacini, and Sinason 1999). Furthermore, internal auditors’ job roles
generally prescribe them to report discovered wrongdoing (e.g., Miceli and Near 2002; Near and
Miceli 1986; Near and Miceli 1988; Near, Dworkin, and Miceli 1993; Rezaee 2005). However, a
recent blog posting from Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) president and CEO, Richard
Chambers, makes it clear that internal auditors are not immune to moral failures and poor
decisions. In this posting, Richard Chambers notes that internal auditors are “human” and are
“subject to the same pressures…as everyone else in the enterprise” (Chambers 2012a). The
posting continues with Chambers noting several cases where internal auditors’ ethical compasses
failed “rather spectacularly.” To illustrate his argument, he lists several hypothetical scenarios
that contain ethical dilemmas, one of which follows:

You are in a rotational assignment in internal audit. You are slated to rotate into an
undetermined business unit in a year. You just audited the business unit in which you
most want to work, and have some critical findings. Do you report them or sit on them?
(2012a).
As illustrated in this scenario, rotational internal audit assignments can be particularly
problematic for auditor objectivity. To this point, prior research indicates that using the internal
audit function as a MTG reduces auditor objectivity with regard to management’s aggressive
accounting choices, risk assessment, and investment decisions (Rose, Rose, and Norman 2013;
Hoos, Messier, Smith, and Paulette 2013). However, research has not yet examined the potential
dysfunctional effects of MTG on internal auditor fraud reporting, also known as whistleblowing.1
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When referring to internal auditors, some prefer the term “reporting” rather than “whistleblowing” (e.g., Jubb
2000). For purposes of this study, the terms are used interchangeably.
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The current study posits that using the internal audit function as a MTG could lead to
dysfunctional whistleblowing effects, as it could reduce the likelihood that internal auditors will
report discovered fraud. Relying on motivated reasoning theory and economic incentive theory,
it is hypothesized that internal auditors who are being groomed for a management position will
be less likely to report a financial statement fraud compared to auditors not being groomed for
management. The magnitude of the fraud could also influence the internal auditors’ reporting
intentions. While hypothesized that larger frauds are more likely to be reported (e.g., Robinson,
Robertson, and Curtis 2012), internal auditors face unique incentives to report smaller frauds
(Sarens and de Beelde 2006) rather than larger frauds, so the potential impact of fraud magnitude
is somewhat unclear.
Using a 2x2 between-participants experiment, the current study manipulates the use of
the internal audit function as a MTG (used as a training ground vs. not used as a training ground)
and fraud magnitude (large fraud, defined as 30 percent of net income vs. small fraud, defined as
one percent of net income). Results suggest that internal auditors are significantly less likely to
report a discovered fraud when the internal auditor is being groomed for a management position.
However, no effect is found for fraud magnitude, as internal auditors appear equally likely to
report large and small frauds.
In addition, the current study examines the components of the Schultz, Johnson, Morris,
and Dyrnes (1993) Model of Discretionary Reporting in relation to MTG use and fraud
magnitude. The Schultz et al. (1993) model holds that three primary factors influence the
reporting decision: the perceived seriousness of the act, the perceived responsibility to report,
and the perceived personal costs associated with reporting. As expected, results indicate that
participants perceived large frauds to be more serious than small frauds. In regard to perceived
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responsibility to report, no effect of MTG or fraud magnitude is found. Specifically, participants
indicated a strong belief that the internal auditor has a personal responsibility to report fraud,
regardless of fraud magnitude or use of the internal audit function as a MTG. Finally, it is
expected that when the internal audit function is used as a MTG, the perceived personal costs
associated with a large fraud will be higher than when internal audit is not used as a MTG.
However, this hypothesis is not supported, as no relation is found.
This study also examines the impact of Machiavellianism on fraud reporting intentions in
the MTG context. Machiavellianism refers to one’s tendency to use manipulation and deception
to achieve self-seeking goals (Christie and Geis 1970). Measuring ethical disposition (e.g.,
Machiavellianism) is important, as the whistleblowing decision generally includes a moral or
ethical component (e.g., Arnold and Ponemon 1991; Miceli, Near, and Schwenk 1991). After
measuring respondents’ Machiavellianism using a 10-item measure, results indicate that the
impact of MTG on fraud reporting intentions is not contingent on the individual’s
Machiavellianism score. However, it should be noted that no internal auditor participants
qualified as high-Machs on the Machiavellianism scale.
Supplemental analysis reveals that having a MTG feature reduces the perceived urgency
to report a fraudulent act. Moreover, the reporting urgency associated with large frauds is
reduced to levels statistically equivalent to small frauds. Stated differently, having a MTG
feature appears to cause internal auditors to view a large fraud (30 percent of net income) with a
reduced sense of urgency to report, as though it were a small fraud (one percent of net income).
This study offers several contributions to the literature. First, this is the first study to
experimentally examine the impact of using the internal audit function as a MTG on fraud
reporting intentions. While this study examines only one incentive (training ground), the results
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could provide insight into a broader research area: how incentives influence the objectivity of
internal auditors with regard to fraud reporting. This is an important area about which little is
known. Second, this study reveals an interesting lack of effect associated with fraud magnitude.
Specifically, internal auditors in the current setting were no more likely to report a large fraud
(30 percent of net income) than a small fraud (one percent of net income). This is an unexpected
finding, as a positive association between fraud magnitude and reporting intentions was
anticipated. Third, this is the first study to examine Machiavellianism in internal auditors and is
among the first to examine the effects of Machiavellianism on fraud reporting intentions. Fourth,
through post-experimental questionnaire items, this study attempts to partially disentangle two
theories that may be explaining the results: motivated reasoning theory and economic incentive
theory. Based on the results of this study, it appears that internal auditors are fully aware of their
responsibility to report all fraud, but may be less willing to report fraud in the presence of a
MTG. This supports the economic incentive theory explanation. Finally, the results may provide
further evidence to corroborate the IIA’s concern about the ethical compass of internal auditors.
The results of this study should be important to several parties. First, audit committees
should be interested in dysfunctional fraud reporting effects, since they are trusting internal
auditors to be their “eyes and ears” in the organization (IIA 2013b). Second, the results should be
important to Chief Audit Executives (CAEs). While CAEs are likely aware of objectivity threats
associated with the use of the internal audit function as a MTG, they may be unaware that these
threats could extend to internal auditors’ fraud reporting decisions. Finally, the results should be
of interest to the IIA, as they are the professional association responsible for internal audit
standards and guidance in practice. While the advantages of using the internal audit function as a
MTG may be substantial, it is vital for the IIA to fully understand the risks to objectivity
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associated with the practice, particularly as they relate to something as consequential as fraud
reporting.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. The next section provides
background information, theory, hypothesis development, and research questions. Section III
describes the methodology, including details about the participants, design, experimental task, as
well as the independent and dependent variables. The results and summary of the study are
presented in Section IV. Section V concludes the study and offers implications, limitations, and
suggestions for future research.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Accounting Whistleblowing Literature
Whistleblowing Defined and Seminal Accounting Whistleblowing Literature
Whistleblowing is commonly defined in academic literature as “the disclosure by
organizational members (former or current) of illegal, immoral, or illegitimate practices under
the control of their employers, to persons or organizations that may be able to effect action”
(Near and Miceli 1985, 4). The literature on whistleblowing is vast and covers multiple
disciplines including, but not limited to, business, psychology, and sociology.
Whistleblowing literature specific to accounting began in the early 1990s. This stream of
research finds roots in a study by Arnold and Ponemon (1991). Using 106 internal auditors, the
authors conduct an experiment in which a hypothetical fraud is discovered by an internal auditor.
They find that whistleblowing intentions are positively associated with moral reasoning, and
negatively associated with fear of retaliation. Similarly, Finn and Lampe (1992) experimentally
examine the whistleblowing intentions of external auditors and find a significant relation
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between auditor ethical judgments and their whistleblowing intentions. Further, they suggest that
an auditor’s ethical judgment is influenced by both issue-related factors and situational factors.
Schultz et al. (1993) examine whistleblowing across cultures and develop a model (based on
Graham 1986) of whistleblowing in which reporting likelihood is increasing in the perceived
seriousness of the act and in the perceived personal responsibility to report, and decreasing in the
expected personal costs of reporting.
Hooks, Kaplan, and Schultz (1994) provide a synthesis of the whistleblowing literature
and document various organizational, situational, and personal factors that influence
whistleblowing. Of interest to the current study, Hooks et al. (1994) note that whistleblowing
increases when encouraged by job roles (Arnold and Ponemon 1991; Miceli and Near 1984;
Miceli et al. 1991; Schultz et al. 1993). Ponemon (1994) expands on Hooks et al. (1994) with a
continued synthesis of the whistleblowing literature. Like Hooks et al. (1994), Ponemon
documents that organizational position can influence whistleblowing behavior. As noted by
Ponemon, a study by Near and Miceli (1986) finds that internal auditors may be “…instructed to
blow the whistle as part of their jobs—that is, their behavior is role-prescribed…” (137).
However, Near and Miceli (1988) suggest a possible ethical tension, given that internal auditors
are prescribed to report wrongdoing, but the disclosure of wrongdoing can be detrimental to the
organization’s profits and reputation.
Empirical Research on Internal Auditors as Whistleblowers
Various studies in accounting directly examine whistleblowing in an external audit
setting (e.g., Kaplan 1995; Kaplan and Whitecotton 2001; Patel 2003). In addition, numerous
studies examine the internal auditor as a recipient of whistleblower information (e.g., Kaplan and
Schultz 2007; Kaplan, Pope, and Samuels 2010; Miceli, Near, Rehg, and Van Scotter 2012).
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However, a smaller body of research examines the internal auditor as a whistleblower. Some
researchers argue that internal auditors cannot be whistleblowers, since internal auditor reporting
is role-prescribed and occurs internally (Courtemanche 1988; Jubb 1999, 2000). To this point,
when referring to internal auditor whistleblowing, Jubb (2000) prefers the terms “reporting” and
“informing” rather than whistleblowing. Nonetheless, most of the extant literature supports the
notion of internal auditors as whistleblowers (e.g., Arnold and Ponemon 1991; Dozier and Miceli
1985; Miceli et al. 1991; Near et al. 1993; Xu and Ziegenfuss 2008). Furthermore, internal
auditor reporting satisfies the requirements of the definition of whistleblowing, which was noted
previously (Near and Miceli 1985).
Arnold and Ponemon (1991) experimentally examine the reporting intentions of internal
auditors. Specifically, the internal auditor participants were asked to evaluate the likelihood of
another individual disclosing a hypothetical wrongdoing. They find reduced reporting likelihood
for internal auditors with lower levels of moral reasoning, particularly for those who fear
retaliation from management. Interestingly, internal auditor participants evaluated external
auditors as being more likely (than internal auditors) to blow the whistle.
Miceli et al. (1991) survey 653 directors of internal auditing to examine the impact of
various individual and situational variables on internal auditor reporting of wrongdoing. The
authors examine 14 possible wrongdoings faced by participants, ranging from public safety
violations to financial fraud. They find that internal auditors are less likely to report wrongdoing
when they are poor performers, when they view their organization as bureaucratic, and when
they feel they are not prescribed or morally obligated to report the wrongdoing. Moreover,
internal auditors are more likely to report externally when the wrongdoing is theft-related, when
the wrongdoing involves low-level employees, and when there are few other observers.
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Using 185 internal auditors, Xu and Ziegenfuss (2008) experimentally examine the
impact of reward systems on internal auditor fraud reporting intentions. They find an increased
likelihood of internal auditor fraud reporting when cash rewards or long-term employment
contracts are offered to whistleblowers, particularly for those with lower levels of moral
reasoning. Seifert, Sweeney, Joireman, and Thornton (2010) conduct an experiment with 232
internal auditors and 215 management accountants to examine the impact of perceived fairness
on whistleblowing. They find that reporting intentions of both internal auditors and management
accountants are positively influenced by perceptions of organizational justice in the
whistleblowing system.
Finally, using a sample including some internal auditors, Robinson et al. (2012)
experimentally examine the impact of contextual and wrongdoing attributes on the fraud
reporting decision. They find that reporting likelihood is lower for: financial statement fraud
(compared to theft), immaterial fraud (compared to material fraud), frauds in which the
wrongdoer is aware that the potential whistleblower has knowledge of the fraud, and frauds in
which bystanders are not aware.
In sum, extant whistleblowing research involving internal auditors reveals that
whistleblowing is promoted by factors including cash rewards, employment-related incentives,
and perceived organizational justice. Conversely, whistleblowing is reduced by fear of
retaliation, poor job performance of the whistleblower, and whistleblower perceptions that their
organization is highly bureaucratic. However, the most consistent finding in this stream of
research relates to the importance of moral/ethical reasoning in the internal auditor’s reporting
decision.
Internal Audit

9

The Role of the Internal Auditor
The role of external auditors is prescribed by the PCAOB. However, the role of internal
auditors is not determined by legislation or regulatory bodies. Role guidance for internal auditors
is limited to authoritative guidance from the IIA (Deloitte 2013). The IIA defines internal
auditing as “an independent, objective assurance and consulting activity designed to add value
and improve an organization's operations . . . by bringing a systematic, disciplined approach to
evaluate and improve the effectiveness of risk management, control, and governance processes”
(IIA 2013a). Notwithstanding this widely-used definition, the role of the internal auditor varies
significantly among companies. Some internal audit departments focus primarily on compliance
functions, while others are essentially business consultants (Nagy and Cenker 2002; Stewart and
Subramaniam 2010; Ahlawat and Lowe 2004).
While each internal audit function differs in its prescribed role within the organization,
Deloitte (2013) provides a summary of the major roles and responsibilities of internal auditors.
These responsibilities include evaluating control, risk management, and governance systems;
reporting risk and control deficiencies; recommending ways to improve operating efficiency and
effectiveness; evaluating information security, regulatory compliance, and preparedness for
business interruptions, and providing anti-fraud support to the company. Similarly, Prawitt,
Smith, and Wood (2009) note wide variation across organizations with regard to internal auditor
duties, which include “among other tasks, financial, operational, fraud, control, compliance, or
systems audits as well as internal consulting projects for management” (1261).
Since the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), the internal audit function is seen as one of
the four essential cornerstones of corporate governance, complementing executive management,
external audit, and the board of directors (Adamec, Leinicke, Ostrosky, Rexroad 2005; Gramling

10

Maletta, Schneider, and Church 2004). Internal audit departments have been recruited to assist
both management and external auditors in analyzing and testing internal controls, pursuant to
PCAOB Auditing Standard No. 5 (Adamec et al. 2005; Cohn 2011). As noted by Adamec et al.
(2005), internal auditors often consult with management regarding a firm’s enterprise risk
management and compliance with regulations and laws. In addition, internal auditors are
presumed to be the “eyes and ears” of the audit committee often assisting the audit committee in
duties such as the selection of external auditors, negotiating audit fees, and assessing the external
auditor’s work quality (Adamec et al. 2005; Saint 2013). Currently, the internal audit function
appears to have more direct access to the audit committee than ever before (Kaplan and Schultz
2006; IIA 2013b).
Internal auditors also have a duty to assess a company’s compliance with its code of
ethics. According to IIA Standard 2110.A1, the internal audit function must “evaluate the design,
implementation, and effectiveness of the organization's ethics-related objectives, programs, and
activities” (Jackson 2012, 39). As Jackson (2012) notes, internal auditors have an obligation to
blow the whistle on ethical violations, and this may be especially problematic when the
perpetrators are high-level employees concerned with the “financial bottom line” (41).
The Roles and Responsibilities of the Internal Auditor in the Whistleblowing Process
The role of the internal audit function in fraud detection varies widely among companies.
A 2012 IIA survey and related 2013 roundtable discussion finds that some “audit committee
representatives had no expectation that internal or external auditors would detect fraud, while
others defined their roles in fraud detection as essential” (IIA 2013b, 7). Nonetheless, 31 percent
of IIA survey respondents indicated that internal audit has the primary role in detecting financial
reporting fraud.
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Internal Auditors as Recipients of Information
Internal auditors are often recipients of information from whistleblowers (e.g., Kaplan
and Schultz 2007; Kaplan et al. 2010; Miceli et al. 2012; Wells 2001). Read and Rama (2003,
354) note that internal auditors are “natural outlets for whistle-blowers” and report that 71
percent of chief internal auditors they surveyed had received a recent whistleblowing complaint,
with 43 percent reporting a complaint related to financial fraud. Some companies explicitly
present internal auditors as outlets for employee reporting. For example, EngenderHealth’s
whistleblowing policy specifically instructs employees to report suspected fraudulent activity to
the employee’s direct supervisor, or when the supervisor is involved, to the internal auditor
(2013).
SOX Section 301 mandates audit committees to establish procedures for employees to
voice complaints regarding accounting, internal controls, or auditing matters, and to
confidentially and anonymously report concerns over questionable accounting or auditing. Audit
committees have flexibility in the implementation of this mandate, and frequently establish
internally or externally administered reporting hotlines (Kaplan, Pany, Samuels, and Zhang
2009). In some cases, the internal audit function is the recipient of these hotline reports (Peterson
2006; Curtis 2006b). For example, a survey of 119 CAEs whose companies were subject to SOX
provisions finds that the internal audit function is the most common party assigned (71 percent)
the duty to follow up on anonymous reports of fraud (Kaplan and Schultz 2006). In addition, the
survey finds that the internal audit function generally includes the responsibility to investigate,
document, and resolve reports of wrongdoing.
Internal Auditors as Identifiers of Information
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In addition to being recipients of reported information, internal auditors are often the
identifiers of original information regarding fraud or unethical behavior. According to the
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) 2012 Report to the Nations, internal audit was
the third most common method of fraud detection, with 14.4 percent of frauds in the study being
initially detected by the internal audit function. The question arises as to how internal auditors
are expected to report original information indicating a possible fraud. In Kaplan and Schultz
(2006), CAEs were asked “Are there circumstances in which Internal Auditors are expected to
report using the whistleblowing process?” A majority of respondents (73 percent) indicated “No,
All Issues Should Be Reported to the CAE for Either Immediate Reporting or for Planning
Future Audits” (15). Thus, it appears that the internal audit function maintains autonomy, and
any internal audit findings typically flow through the CAE.
The Kaplan and Schultz (2006) survey also investigated the role of the internal audit
function once a fraud is uncovered or suspected. Fifty-nine percent of respondents indicated that
they would further investigate to determine the extent of the fraud, while eleven percent
indicated they would immediately report their findings to the audit committee; fifteen percent
stated they would report to the CEO/CFO. Other parties the internal audit function may report to
include general legal counsel and fraud investigation units. In addition, many internal audit
departments are involved with the follow-up to see a discovered fraud through to an appropriate
resolution. Interestingly, the authors also find that when the internal audit function is comprised
of rotating staff, the likelihood of the internal audit function being involved in the fraud followup is reduced (Kaplan and Schultz 2006).
Internal Auditor Independence and Objectivity
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A substantial body of research examines the independence and objectivity of internal
auditors. Stewart and Subramaniam (2010) provide a thorough review of this literature, and they
begin by noting the necessary distinction between the IIA definitions of independence and
objectivity. Independence refers to the “freedom from conditions that threaten objectivity or the
appearance of objectivity” while objectivity refers to an “unbiased mental attitude that allows
internal auditors to perform engagements in such a manner that they have an honest belief in
their work product and that no significant quality compromises are made” (Stewart and
Subramaniam 2010, 330). As noted previously, internal auditors are mandated to be objective
and independent (IIA 2013a; IIA 2009). More specifically, the IIA Code of Ethics (2009)
provides three rules of conduct related to objectivity. Internal auditors:
• shall not participate in any activity or relationship that may impair or be presumed to
impair their unbiased assessment. This participation includes those activities or
relationships that may be in conflict with the interests of the organization.
• shall not accept anything that may impair or be presumed to impair their professional
judgment; and
• shall disclose all material facts known to them that, if not disclosed, may distort the
reporting of activities under review.
The IIA clearly values independence and objectivity as essential characteristics for the
internal audit function. However, as noted by Arnold and Ponemon (1991), “there are no other
roles within the internal control system that have such obviously split obligations to management
and to outside stakeholders” (2).
Threats to Objectivity Related to Organizational Status
Extant literature uncovers various threats to internal auditor objectivity. One such threat
is the status of the internal audit function within organizations. Most of the literature in this area
focuses on the relationship between the internal audit function and the audit committee, as the
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audit committee is typically charged with providing the internal auditors with the environment
and support needed to carry out their activities (Gramling et al. 2004). Using survey methods,
Raghunandan, Rama, and Read (2001) find evidence that audit committees with independent
directors and at least one financial expert have a better and more thorough working relationship
with the internal audit function. Similarly, Goodwin and Yeo (2001) find a greater level of
interaction between the audit committee and the internal audit function when audit committee
members are independent, while Goodwin (2003) finds that both independence and financial
experience are important factors in cultivating an appropriate relationship between the internal
audit function and the audit committee. Carcello, Hermanson, and Neal (2002) examine proxy
statement disclosures and find that audit committees offer relatively few disclosures relating to
the internal audit function, which the authors conclude reflects a lack of audit committee
oversight.
In a survey of bank loan officers, James (2003) finds that bankers perceive less protection
against fraudulent reporting when in-house internal audit departments report to management,
compared to when they report solely to the audit committee. Similarly, Christopher, Sarens, and
Leung (2009) find evidence of various threats to independence, including reporting structures in
which the internal auditor does not report to the audit committee. Among other things, Leung,
Cooper, and Robertson (2004) find wide variability in reporting procedures, with some internal
audit functions reporting solely to management and others to the audit committee. A survey by
Paape, Scheffe, and Snoep (2003) finds similar results in European companies, with less than
half of CAE participants indicating they report to the audit committee. In a survey of Australian
internal auditors, O’Leary and Stewart (2007) find that governance mechanisms are related to
internal auditors’ ethical decision making. Specifically, they find a positive association between
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external audit quality and internal auditors’ ethical decision making. More recently, Sarens,
Abdolmohammadi, and Lenz (2012) find that active governance roles for internal audit functions
are positively associated with risk-based audit plans, the presence of quality assurance and
improvement programs, and active audit committee input to the audit plan.
This body of literature also includes case studies and qualitative projects. In a study of six
New Zealand companies, van Peursem (2005) concludes that a close relationship with
management can put internal auditor independence at risk. Among other things, Sarens and De
Beelde (2006) find that when internal audit functions primarily to support management,
perceived objectivity and the relationship with the audit committee are both weakened. Turley
and Zaman (2007) examine audit committee effectiveness in one U.K. company and conclude
that the audit committee appeared to be most effective via informal processes. Finally, Mat Zain
and Subramaniam (2007) interview Malaysian CAEs and note a need for better reporting lines
between the audit committee and the internal audit function. In sum, audit committee structure,
oversight, and internal auditor communication channels play an important role in objectivity.
This body of literature generally finds that objectivity is enhanced when audit committee
members are independent, and when reporting procedures require that internal auditors report to
the audit committee rather than management.
Threats to Objectivity Due to Internal Auditors’ Dual Roles
Another threat to internal auditor objectivity relates to the internal auditor’s dual role of
providing both assurance and consulting services. Consulting activities foster a partnership
between internal audit and management that could reduce internal auditor objectivity
(Christopher et al. 2009). Several studies examine the prevalence of consulting activities in the
internal audit function. For example, Hass, Abdolmohammadi, and Burnaby (2006) find that
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prior to SOX, internal auditors in the U.S. became increasingly involved in consulting activities,
but post-SOX, their roles have largely shifted back to assurance-related duties. Similarly,
through interviews with internal audit directors, Nagy and Cenker (2002) determine that the role
of the internal audit function had shifted toward consulting and value-added activities during the
1990s.
Various studies examine the dual roles of internal auditors. Brody and Lowe (2000) find
experimental evidence that acting as a consultant can impede internal auditor objectivity, as it
may lead auditors to take positions that align with the best interest of their employer. Melville
(2003) uses a survey to investigate the role of internal auditors in the strategic management of
organizations. He finds that internal auditors are aware of, involved in, and positively contribute
to strategic management in their organizations. Selim, Woodward, and Allegrini (2009) survey
internal auditors in the U.K./Ireland and Italy and find mixed views with regard to whether or not
consulting duties compromise internal auditor objectivity.
According to Schneider (2003), the [pre-SOX] shift toward internal audit consultancy led
to an increase in incentive-based compensation for internal auditors, and this has been confirmed
empirically (DeZoort et al. 2000; Dickens and O’Reilly 2009). It also appears that incentivebased compensation remains prevalent post-SOX. For example, Dickens and O’Reilly (2009)
report that 89 percent of respondent CAEs have compensation arrangements that involve stockbased compensation or bonuses that are calculated based on operating results. Schneider (2003)
experimentally examines whether incentive compensation and stock ownership impact internal
auditor objectivity. He finds that while stock ownership had no effect on objectivity, incentive
compensation tied to stock price did have an effect. Specifically, incentive compensation tied to
stock price led to a significantly higher percentage of internal auditors choosing to not report a
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GAAP violation compared to fixed compensation or compensation tied to earnings. In the same
vein, Ahlawat and Lowe (2004) experimentally examine whether the consulting role of internal
auditors and outsourcing versus in-house auditing influence auditor objectivity. They find that
internal auditors are susceptible to client advocacy, but the advocacy is less severe with
outsourced internal auditors. Finally, Ahmad and Taylor (2009) survey Malaysian internal
auditors and find evidence that, unlike auditors from the U.S., Malaysian internal auditors
perceive no conflict between assurance and consulting roles. Thus, while the evidence is mixed,
the general findings from this literature stream suggest that internal auditors’ dual roles of
providing both assurance and consulting services negatively impact objectivity and perceived
objectivity.
Threats to Objectivity due to ERM
Internal audit involvement with Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) also poses a threat
to objectivity and independence. ERM refers to “a process . . . designed to identify potential
events that may affect the entity, and manage risk to be within its risk appetite . . . ” (COSO
2004, 2). Independence and objectivity threats are due in part to the fact that internal audit
functions may be involved with both the development and assurance of the ERM systems (see
Stewart and Subramaniam 2010).
Descriptive surveys and interviews reveal the growing prevalence and acceptance of
internal auditor involvement in ERM (e.g., Allegrini and D’Onza 2003; Gramling and Myers
2006; Fraser and Henry 2007). However, in an experimental survey of Australian internal
auditors, de Zwaan, Stewart, and Subramaniam (2011) find that internal auditor participation in
ERM reduces perceived objectivity, as it decreases auditors’ inclination to report risk
breakdowns to the audit committee.

18

Threats to Objectivity from Outsourcing and Co-sourcing
Finally, extant research examines the impact of internal auditor outsourcing and cosourcing on objectivity. Outsourcing of internal audit activities to public accounting or specialist
firms has become rather common in recent years (Caplan and Kirschenheiter 2000;
Subramaniam, Ng, and Carey 2004; Dickens and O’Reilly 2009) and is expected to increase in
prevalence (Burnaby et al. 2007).
Several studies examine the effect of outsourcing on independence and objectivity with
mixed results. James (2003) finds that loan officers perceive outsourced internal auditors
(acquired from Big 5 firms) to be more objective than in-house internal auditors. Conversely,
Dickens and O’Reilly (2009) find a positive association between material weakness frequency
and the proportion of outsourced internal audit work. Similarly, respondents in a U.K. survey
indicate a perception that outsourced internal auditors are not more objective than in-house
internal auditors (Selim and Yiannakas 2000).
Two experimental studies examine the effect of outsourcing on internal auditor
objectivity. As noted previously, Ahlawat and Lowe (2004) conduct an experiment with U.S.
internal auditors and find that outsourcing mitigates client advocacy, thus increasing objectivity.
Lastly, Gramling and Vandervelde (2006) conduct an experiment with both internal and external
auditors and find that external auditors perceive higher objectivity when internal audit duties are
outsourced, while internal auditors perceive higher objectivity when internal audit duties are
conducted in-house.
In summary, internal auditor independence and objectivity are mandated by IIA
guidelines but are difficult to achieve due to situational factors faced by internal auditors. Roussy
(2013) provides a striking depiction of internal auditor objectivity and independence. Through
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insight gained from 42 interviews with Canadian internal auditors, Roussy (2013) develops the
term “grey independence” to describe the conflicting roles internal auditors face. As expressed
by one of the interviewees, “the implication is that you’re either ‘dependent’ or ‘independent’ –
that it’s black or white. But it doesn’t work like that! Yes, perhaps it’s important but, in any case,
if something can help to improve the organization, we’ll stick our neck out and that’s it; too bad
for independence!” (Roussy 2013, 561).
Internal Audit as a Training Ground for Management
The specific objectivity threat of interest to the current study is the threat stemming from
using the internal audit function as a management training ground (MTG), a procedure in which
individuals are hired into or transferred into internal audit for a short term before being promoted
to a management position. Using the internal audit function as a MTG has become quite
common. Goodwin and Yeo (2001) surveyed 65 internal auditors in Singapore and found
extensive use of the internal audit function as a MTG. Kaplan and Schultz (2006) note that 23
percent of survey respondents indicate that internal audit staff rotate through internal audit to
other positions. However, the practice could be even more prevalent than Kaplan and Schultz
(2006) indicate. By some estimates, nearly 50 percent or more of publicly traded companies use
the internal audit function as a MTG (Oxner and Oxner 2006; Christopher et al. 2009). Abbott et
al. (2010) note that 65 percent of their internal auditor respondents from Fortune 1000 firms
report that they use the internal audit function as a MTG.
The extensive use of the internal audit function as a MTG stems from the benefits of the
practice. Goodwin and Yeo (2001) provide a thorough discussion of the benefits. First, internal
audit performs work for various departments within an organization, so future managers can
learn how the different departments function (Reeve 1990). Second, time spent in internal audit
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teaches future managers to better understand internal controls (Ridley 2001; Stewart and
Subramaniam 2010). Third, a rotation in internal audit allows management to evaluate potential
talent (Galloway 1995).
Selim, Sudarsanam, and Lavine (2003) note that several U.S. and European companies
“thought IA was such an excellent training program, that organisational policy pushed many or
all internal auditors to seek other opportunities in the organisation after an initial rotation or ‘tour
of duty’ in internal audit” (240). In practice, at least two variations of MTG occur. In some cases,
individuals are hired and initially assigned to internal audit with the promise for promotion to a
management position after a stint in internal audit (Goodwin and Yeo 2001). Alternatively, some
companies assign operations managers to internal audit (and often to senior internal audit
positions) for a three to five year period, after which the individuals return to a higher
management position (Chadwick 1995). Even the CAE position is subject to use as a MTG
(Messier, Reynolds, Simon, and Wood 2011; PricewaterhouseCoopers 2000). Companies
implement this procedure in order to “train versatile, well-rounded senior managers” (Chadwick
1995, 63). Arena, Arnaboldi, and Azzone (2006) find evidence of training ground use in two of
six companies in their case study, proposing that using the internal audit function as a MTG can
improve the manager’s understanding of a company’s business activities. Recent research
uncovers another benefit of MTG that is associated with recruiting. Burton, Starliper, Summers,
and Wood (2013) find experimental evidence that having a MTG makes the internal audit
position more attractive to experienced job candidates.
Notwithstanding the benefits of using the internal audit function as a MTG, there are also
potential hazards associated with this practice. The chief concern associated with using the
internal audit function as a MTG appears to be related to its impact on auditor objectivity.
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Internal auditors who are planning to transition to a management position may feel little or no
incentive to improve the internal audit function long-term and thus may be less willing to take
strong positions on matters that arise (Chadwick 1995; Goodwin and Yeo 2001). Various studies
have suggested that the practice could reduce internal auditor objectivity (e.g., Goodwin and Yeo
2001; Arena et al. 2006; Oxner and Oxner 2006; Christopher et al. 2009; Abbott et al. 2010;
Stewart and Subramaniam 2010). A recent study (Rose et al. 2013) explicitly tests this
assumption and finds experimental evidence indicating that internal auditors are less objective
when being groomed for a management position. Specifically, they find that internal auditors are
more likely to agree with an aggressive accounting policy promoted by management when the
internal auditors are expecting to move into a senior management position. Hoos et al. (2013)
also experimentally examine the training ground effect on internal auditor objectivity. Using 88
internal auditors from the gaming industry, they find that when the internal audit function is used
as a MTG, internal auditors provide lower risk assessments when reporting to management
(versus the audit committee) and more favorable investment recommendations. Thus, both Rose
et al. (2013) and Hoos et al. (2013) find evidence of impaired objectivity stemming from the use
of internal audit as a MTG.
Extant research also demonstrates other negative consequences stemming from the use of
internal audit as a MTG. Using both archival and experimental methods, Messier et al. (2011)
examine external auditor perceptions associated with the use of a MTG. They find that external
auditor fees are higher when clients use the internal audit function as a MTG. This is due to the
fact that external auditors perceive internal auditors to be less objective when being groomed for
management positions. After controlling for other variables, Anderson, Christ, Johnstone, and
Rittenberg (2012) find that internal audit functions that are used as a MTG are larger than those
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not used as a MTG, which suggests they may be less efficient. Furthermore, Christ, Sharp, Masli,
and Wood (2013) find that the use of the internal audit function as a MTG is associated with
lower financial reporting quality.
Internal auditors who are being groomed for a management position face conflicting
incentives, particularly when the internal audit function involves compliance roles. On one hand,
the internal auditor is charged with conducting an objective audit and reporting all relevant
findings. On the other hand, when being groomed for a management position, the auditor has a
competing incentive to protect his future position. As noted by Stewart and Subramaniam
(2010), the IIA has partially responded to the threat of a loss in objectivity from internal audit
staff rotation by disallowing new internal audit staff to audit activities they previously performed
until after at least one year. However, the threats associated with MTG remain. While recent
research (Rose et al. 2013; Hoos et al. 2013) finds evidence that the practice can negatively
impact internal auditor objectivity, extant research has not examined any potential training
ground effects on fraud reporting, commonly referred to as whistleblowing.
According to motivated reasoning theory, a decision maker’s judgment can be both
knowingly and unknowingly biased when the decision maker is incentivized by personal benefit
or avoidance of harm (Kunda 1990). As concisely stated by Kunda (1990) “People are more
likely to arrive at those conclusions that they want to arrive at” (495). As it relates to unethical
behavior, evidence in psychology on motivated reasoning generally finds that unconscious bias
toward corruption is the rule, while intentional dishonesty is the exception (Moore, Tetlock,
Tanlu, and Bazerman 2006).

23

When an internal auditor is being groomed for a management position, extant research
shows that his objectivity can be reduced, and this effect is attributed to motivated reasoning2
(Rose et al. 2013; Hoos et al. 2013). In addition, according to Moore et al. (2006) most auditors
and accountants likely do not intentionally disregard their professional duties but instead do not
realize that incentives are shaping their judgments and actions. It is plausible, therefore, that due
to motivated reasoning, a loss of internal auditor objectivity can lead to something as egregious
as a reduced tendency to report a fraud for which there is fairly strong evidence. In reporting the
fraud, internal auditors will be potentially exposing the company to reputational and monetary
damages.
As noted previously, internal auditors face a variety of objectivity threats as well as
incentives to protect their company from harm (e.g., stock-based compensation). The current
study is concerned with the incremental effect of MTG use on fraud reporting intentions. It may
seem unlikely that an internal auditor would shift from a position of definitely reporting a fraud
to definitely not reporting due to career incentives. Nonetheless, this notion is supported by Perry
and Bryan (1997) who suggest that “internal auditors may be concerned about their own career
implications of fraud detection and therefore not report cases of fraud” (42). Therefore, extant
research findings suggest that internal auditors’ reporting likelihood may decrease due to MTG.
This leads to the following hypothesis:
H1: Internal auditors will be less likely to report a fraudulent act when the internal
audit function is used as a management training ground relative to when the
internal audit function is not used as a management training ground.
2

In a review of Rose et al. (2013), Koonce (2013) argues that economic incentive theory, in addition to (or rather
than) motivated reasoning theory may be at work. According to economic incentive theory, the internal auditor will
rationally and objectively process the situation and conclude that less objectivity is preferable. Conversely,
according to motivated reasoning theory the internal auditor will not rationally or objectively process the situation,
yet the incentives will create preferences which will unknowingly influence the auditor’s decision. Thus, as Koonce
(2013) notes, economic incentive theory suggests the same results as motivated reasoning theory. Further, these two
forces are often naturally confounded and are not easily disentangled. The current study attempts to partially
disentangle the theories via debriefing questions.
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Fraud Magnitude, Perceived Seriousness and Reporting Likelihood
In accounting, perceived seriousness of fraud is a generally viewed as a function of
materiality (Schultz et al. 1993; Robinson et al. 2012). However, a fraud of any magnitude
perpetrated by management in an attempt to misrepresent the financial position or operating
results of an entity is considered material under SOX Section 303(a) (Vorhies 2005). As noted by
Vorhies (2005), the intent, not the amount, makes an act fraudulent. Furthermore, a fraud that is
perceived as immaterial could be the only visible portion of a much larger fraud (Wells 2003).
Wells (2003) remarks, “When it comes to upper management, there is no such thing as an
immaterial fraud.”
In an archival study examining U.S. corporate frauds from 1996 to 2004, Dyck, Morse,
and Zingales (2010) find a positive association between fraud detection and fraud size. Larger
frauds may be viewed as more serious and potentially more consequential to the organization. To
this point, Miceli et al. (1991) note that “reporting wrongdoing of some types of activity (serious
fraud, for example) may be viewed as part of one’s job, whereas reporting other types of
activity…may not” (117). As noted previously, internal auditors are expected to report
discovered fraudulent acts of any magnitude, as this is generally prescribed by their position
(e.g., Jackson 2012; Near and Miceli 1986; Near et al. 1993; Rezaee 2005). However, evidence
from Robinson et al. (2012) suggests that individuals may be less likely to report immaterial
financial statement frauds relative to material financial statement frauds. Specifically, using a
sample that included 17 percent internal auditors, they find that participants are significantly less
likely to report an immaterial fraud compared to a material fraud.
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Conversely, other evidence suggests that for internal auditors, reporting likelihood may
be greater for small frauds than large frauds. Disclosures of small fraudulent acts can actually
benefit the internal audit function. Sarens and de Beelde (2006) describe a case in which the
discovery of two small frauds contributed to the approval of the internal audit function. As noted
by the company CFO “…it is good to have such [small fraud] cases, that shake people awake and
prove the benefit of having an internal audit function” (Sarens and de Beelde 2006, 233). It has
been documented that large corporate scandals in other companies helps draw attention to and
increase appreciation for internal audit in one’s own company (e.g., Carcello, Hermanson, and
Raghunandan 2005), and Sarens and de Beelde (2006) suggest that small frauds within a
company can have the same outcome. According to the Association of Certified Fraud
Examiners (ACFE) 2012 Report to the Nations, out of 14 detection sources, internal audit ranks
as the third most common method of fraud detection at 14.4 percent. However, internal audit
ranks last in median loss by detection method. In other words, while internal auditors are
detecting fraudulent activities, they are detecting the smallest frauds. This finding could be due
to the types of frauds internal auditors are investigating. It could also be the case that internal
auditors are catching small frauds that would have become large frauds. However, this pattern
could also suggest that internal auditors are incentivized to find smaller, less damaging frauds.
In summary, while the predicted direction of the relation between internal auditors’
reporting likelihood and fraud magnitude seems unclear, the most likely outcome based on extant
academic research is greater reporting likelihood for larger frauds. IIA guidelines indicate that
fraud magnitude should not impact the reporting intentions of internal auditors. However, prior
literature clearly shows a tendency for fraud magnitude to positively impact individuals’
reporting intentions. While the possibly exists that fraud size may be negatively associated with
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internal auditor reporting intentions, based on prior research a positive association is expected.
This leads to the following hypothesis:
H2: Reporting likelihood will be greater when fraud magnitude is large relative to
when fraud magnitude is small

Robinson et al. (2012) note that various whistleblowing studies find that reporting
likelihood increases as perceived seriousness of the act increases (Hooks et al. 1994; Miceli and
Near 1985; Taylor and Curtis 2010). In addition, a recent study by Cassematis and Wortley
(2013) examines prediction of whistleblowing and non-reporting observation and finds that
whistleblowers perceive greater levels of seriousness than those who do not report wrongdoing.
Given that perceived seriousness of fraud is generally viewed as a function of materiality
(Schultz et al. 1993; Robinson et al. 2012), it is expected that perceived seriousness will be
positively associated with fraud magnitude.
H3: Perceived seriousness will be greater when fraud magnitude is large relative to
when fraud magnitude is small

Personal Responsibility to Report
In addition to perceived seriousness, an individual’s personal responsibility to report has
been shown to influence reporting intentions (Schultz et al. 1993). Prior research consistently
finds that personal responsibility positively impacts reporting intentions. Kaplan and
Whitecotton (2001) find that perceived personal responsibility influenced auditors’ intentions to
report that a colleague was considering an ethical violation. Similarly, Ayers and Kaplan (2005)
find that along with perceived seriousness and personal costs, perceived personal responsibility
impacts reporting intentions for IT professionals to report a wrongdoing committed by
consultants. Further, Curtis (2006a) examines the effect of mood (manipulated via poor exam
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scores) on audit students’ reporting intentions and finds that perceived seriousness and perceived
personal responsibility mediate the relationship between mood and reporting intentions.
Personal responsibility to report refers to an individual’s perceived duty or obligation to
report an issue and can arise from an individual’s job description (Dalton and Radtke 2013). As
discussed previously, internal auditors are generally role-prescribed to report discovered
wrongdoings (e.g., Miceli and Near 2002; Near and Miceli 1986; Near and Miceli 1988; Rezaee
2005) and this obligation exists regardless of fraud magnitude or training ground utilization.
Therefore, the impact of fraud magnitude and MTG on perceived responsibility is unclear.
However, results of this study may assist in determining which of two theories explains the
reporting decision (see footnote 1).
If motivated reasoning theory is at work, then the internal auditor will not rationally and
objectively process the situation, even when he attempts to be rational and objective (Kunda
1990). It is plausible for this biased reasoning to lead the internal auditor to irrationally feel less
personal responsibility to report even when the situation clearly demonstrates that the auditor has
full responsibility to report.
Conversely, if economic incentive theory is at work, the internal auditor should rationally
and objectively evaluate the situation and choose the course of action that benefits him the most
(e.g., Hales 2007; Koonce 2013). Koonce (2013) suggests that economic incentive theory, in
addition to (or rather than) motivated reasoning theory may explain internal auditors’ reduced
objectivity and resulting decisions. According to economic incentive theory, the internal auditor
will rationally and objectively process the situation and conclude that less objectivity is
preferable. In this setting, it is likely that the internal auditor would recognize his responsibility
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to report the fraud but would rationally decide not to report in order to maximize his benefits.
Since it is unknown which result will hold, the following research question is proposed:
RQ1: How will fraud magnitude and the use of internal audit as a management
training ground impact the perceived responsibility to report the fraudulent act?

Personal Costs
As noted previously, Schultz et al. (1993) finds that the perceived personal cost of
reporting a wrongdoing is an antecedent to reporting intentions, and various studies support this
notion (e.g., Kaplan and Whitecotton 2001; Ayers and Kaplan 2005).3 Perceived personal costs
“refer to the perceived harm or discomfort that could result from reporting wrongdoing” (Dalton
and Radtke 2013, 156). Whistleblowing research largely focuses on personal costs in the form of
retaliation (e.g., Arnold and Ponemon 1991; Near and Miceli 1985, 1986) and generally finds
that retaliation (or threats of retaliation) impedes reporting likelihood (e.g., Bedard, Deis, Curtis,
and Jenkins 2008; Ponemon 1994).
While the threat of retaliation by management exists for internal auditors who blow the
whistle on wrongdoing (Miceli et al. 1991), there are two arguments that suggest that retaliation
is unlikely for internal auditors in a fraud reporting situation. First, due to legislation including
SOX and the Dodd-Frank Act (U.S. House of Representatives 2010), whistleblower protection is
currently strong. For instance, as noted by Xu and Ziegenfuss (2008), the primary focus of the
whistleblowing portion of SOX is on protecting whistleblowers from retaliation. Furthermore,

3

The Schultz et al. (1993) model does not include perceived benefits (promotions, harm prevention, etc.). However,
prior research notes that the reporting decision is a function of a cost-benefit analysis (Dozier and Miceli 1985).
Furthermore, Dalton and Radtke (2013) provide evidence that perceived benefits can act as an antecedent to the
reporting decision. As noted previously, internal auditors who are being groomed for a management position may
receive praise for uncovering a small fraud before it reaches detrimental levels. In addition, the discovery of a small
fraud could favorably impact management’s assessment of the internal auditor being groomed and confirm their
choice in talent. Following Dalton and Radtke (2013) the current experimental survey includes an item to assess the
perceived benefits of reporting.
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upon discovery of a fraud, the perpetrator (arguably the most likely retaliator) would certainly be
terminated from the organization.
Second, internal auditors are role-prescribed to prevent, detect, and report fraud, so any
potential retaliators remaining with the organization after the fraud reporting would have a
difficult time wielding power over an internal auditor who is simply carrying out his prescribed
duties. To this point, Near and Miceli (1986) note that powerful whistleblowers are expected to
face low levels of retaliation. As noted by Arnold and Ponemon (1991), internal auditors
maintain a relatively high level of power in an organization “because of their role, professional
status, and ability to communicate with the highest echelons of management” (13). In addition,
Near et al. (1993) document very low levels of retaliation against internal auditor directors they
surveyed.
The personal cost of interest to this study is the incremental perceived personal cost
associated with MTG. When an internal auditor is being groomed for a management position and
discovers a large fraud, he may perceive the fraud discovery as a threat to the future management
position for which he has been training, as the company could face downsizing or bankruptcy.
However, if the fraud is small this particular threat will likely not exist. This leads to the
following hypothesis:
H4: When internal audit is used as a management training ground, perceived
personal costs associated with a large fraud will increase relative to when internal
audit is not used as a management training ground.

Machiavellianism and Fraud Reporting
Extant research shows that an individual’s ethical ideology is an important factor in the
whistleblowing decision (e.g., Arnold and Ponemon 1991; Keenan 2000; Xu and Ziegenfuss
2008). This stream of research largely relies on either the Defining Issues Test (DIT) (Rest 1979)
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or the Ethics Position Questionnaire (EPQ) (Forsyth 1980) to measure ethical position. Research
using the DIT generally finds that individuals with lower levels of moral reasoning are less likely
to report wrongdoing (Arnold and Ponemon 1991) and are more sensitive to reporting-based
incentives (Xu and Ziegenfuss 2008). Research using the EPQ generally finds that individuals
with high relativism scores are less likely to report wrongdoing, while individuals with high
idealism scores are more likely to report wrongdoing (e.g., Barnett, Bass, and Brown 1996). A
third measure of ethical disposition is the Mach-IV scale, which measures Machiavellianism
(Christie and Geis 1970).
Machiavellianism refers to the tendency to use manipulation and deception to achieve
self-seeking goals (Christie and Geis 1970). The term “Machiavellian” references the sixteenth
century political thinker Niccolo Machiavelli, who promoted cunning and scheming behavior in
order to achieve political gain. He is credited with the adage “the end justifies the means”
(Wakefield 2008). Individuals who score high on the Mach-IV (high-Machs) tend to be able to
disconnect themselves from moral obligations to engage in self-serving behaviors. Furthermore,
high-Machs ignore ethical norms when facing moral issues (Christie and Geis 1970)
Machiavellianism has been widely studied in multiple disciplines, including accounting
(Ghosh 2000; Ghosh and Crain 1996; Hartmann and Maas 2010; Wakefield 2008; Murphy
2012). Ghosh and Crain (1996) conduct an experiment with undergraduate business students and
find that lower-Mach (more ethical) students exhibit less tax noncompliance. Ghosh (2000) finds
that manipulative negotiators (as measured by the Mach-IV) achieve better outcomes in transfer
pricing negotiations when organizational designs are perceived as unfair. Hartmann and Mass
(2010) find experimental evidence that Machiavellianism plays a part in budgetary slack creation
behavior. Wakefield (2008) examines the prevalence of Machiavellianism among accountants
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and its association to several demographic variables. Among other things, she finds that
accountants appear to be less Machiavellian than other vocational groups, and that higher-Mach
accountants seem to be less satisfied with accounting as a career. Among other things, Murphy
(2012) finds experimental evidence indicating that high-Machs are more likely to misreport
financial information, and after misreporting high-Machs feel significantly lower levels of guilt.
Of interest to this study are the whistleblowing implications of Machiavellianism. A
recent study by Dalton and Radtke (2013) utilizes an experiment with 116 MBA students to
examine the effect of Machiavellianism on whistleblowing. The scenario involved a purchasing
agent who finds that his colleague violated corporate policy by accepting a gift from a supplier.
They find that high-Machs are less likely to blow the whistle, and that Machiavellianism impacts
whistleblowing indirectly through perceived responsibility and perceived benefits. They also find
that a strong ethical environment mitigates the dampening effect of Machiavellianism on
whistleblowing intentions.
Extant research has not examined Machiavellianism with respect to internal auditors.4
Therefore, it is unknown how internal auditors will rank with regard to Machiavellianism.
Further, as noted previously, internal auditors have a unique position and role in the
organization. Internal auditors are role-prescribed to report wrongdoing but may be incentivized
to protect the company and not report. Stated differently, internal auditors are mandated to be
objective, but their circumstances often make that impossible (e.g., Roussy 2013). Therefore, it is
also unknown how the level of Machiavellianism will affect fraud reporting intentions for
internal auditors. It seems likely that high-Mach internal auditors will be less likely to report
fraud as they would be more inclined to detach from moral or ethical obligations for self-serving
purposes. Thus, the following research question is proposed:
4

Wakefield (2008) surveys accountants but only four percent of her sample is internal auditors.
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RQ 2: Will the effects of management training ground on reporting intentions be
exacerbated for participants who score high on Machiavellianism?

III. METHOD
Design and Participants
This study employs a 2x2 between-subjects design manipulating use of the internal audit
function as a MTG (used as a training ground vs. not used as a training ground) and magnitude
of the fraudulent act (large vs. small). The primary dependent variable is the participant’s
evaluation of the likelihood that the fraud discoverer will report his findings to the CAE. Internal
auditors were recruited as voluntary participants in the study. Participants received an
information email describing the experiment and informed consent, along with a link to the
experimental survey administered via SurveyMonkey. A total of 3,373 emails were sent to
internal auditor contacts obtained from a database at www.jigsaw.com. After the initial mailing
529 emails were returned as not valid, resulting in 2,844 valid email addresses. A total of 157
responses were obtained, resulting in a response rate of 5.5 percent. Participants were randomly
assigned to one of the four treatment conditions.
Task and Procedures
Participants read a hypothetical case scenario about an internal auditor who discovers
evidence of fraudulent financial reporting. The case was patterned after features from several
studies, including Arnold and Ponemon (1991), Brink, Lowe, and Victoravich (2013), and Rose
et al. (2013). After reading the case, participants were asked to provide responses to dependent
variable items, manipulation check questions, debriefing questions, and demographic questions.
On average, the experimental task required approximately 10-12 minutes to complete. The
complete experimental survey is provided in Appendix A.
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The experimental case provides background information on a hypothetical plastic
manufacturing company, Action Manufacturing Inc. (AMI). Payton Landry is a senior internal
auditor at AMI, and he discovers that the CFO, Nathan Martin, likely engaged in fraudulent
financial reporting through improper journal entries.5 Specifically, it appears that Martin
reclassified certain expenses to long-term assets which had the effect of increasing net income.
Furthermore, this suspected fraudulent behavior has escaped both internal and external auditor
detection for three years, so Landry feels certain he is the only person aware of the fraudulent
behavior. Per AMI protocol, Landry is to report his findings to his CAE.
The experimental case was pilot tested with 55 undergraduate accounting students. Slight
revisions were made to the case, and then it was pilot tested with 5 internal auditors. Final
adjustments were made to reduce the time required for the case, and to clarify some of the survey
items.
Independent Variables
The first independent variable is usage of the internal audit function as a MTG. This
variable is manipulated at two levels (used as a training ground vs. not used as a training
ground). Participants assigned to the training ground condition are informed that Landry is
preparing to transfer into a senior management position in the next few months, as he has worked
in internal audit as part of a management training program. Alternatively, participants assigned
to the no training ground condition are informed that Landry is planning to remain in internal
audit indefinitely, as he plans to be a career internal auditor.
The second independent variable, fraud magnitude, is also manipulated at two levels
(large vs. small). Participants assigned to the large magnitude condition are informed that the

5

Following prior whistleblowing studies, the case is presented in third-person to minimize self-report bias (e.g.,
Arnold and Ponemon 1991; Seifert et al. 2010; Xu and Ziegenfuss 2008).
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fraud perpetrated by the CFO had the effect of increasing net income by thirty percent, while
participants in the small magnitude condition are informed that the fraud had the effect of
increasing net income by one percent6.
Dependent Variables
The primary dependent variable in this study is the participant’s assessed likelihood that
Landry will report the fraud to his CAE. Participants responded on a scale from 0 percent (no
likelihood, definitely would not report) to 100 percent (high likelihood, definitely would report).
Other dependent variable items capture hypothesized antecedents to the reporting decision
(Schultz et al. 1993). Respondents were asked to indicate the perceived seriousness of the act, to
assess the level of personal responsibility of Landry to report his findings to the CAE, and to
assess the likelihood of negative repercussions and personal costs to Landry if he reports. These
three items were assessed on a 7-point Likert-type scale (see Appendix A).
Post-Experimental Questionnaire
Following the dependent variable items, the questionnaire included manipulation check
questions, debriefing items, and demographic questions. Manipulation check questions were
included to validate the effectiveness of the manipulations. Debriefing items were included to
provide insight into the psychological determinants of participants’ reporting decisions. Finally,
demographic variables were included to examine as covariates and to confirm randomization.
Demographic variables include age, years of experience, gender, professional certifications held,
attained education, and several job-specific perceptual variables.

IV. RESULTS

6

Specific fraud magnitude levels (one percent and thirty percent) were selected based on pilot test results and
discussions with internal auditors.
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Demographics and Covariates
As noted previously, a total of 157 internal auditors completed the experimental survey
with a response rate of 5.5 percent. This response rate is not surprising and is consistent with
expectations associated with email-solicited survey participation (e.g., Bryant, Hunton, and
Stone 2004). Participants’ demographic information is summarized in Table 1. As shown in
Panel A, the average participant age was 46.09 years, and the average work experience was
14.58 years. As shown in Panel B, 68.9 percent of respondents were male. The most common
professional designation is Certified Public Accountant (63.1 percent). The majority of
respondents hold either a Bachelor’s degree (46.4 percent) or Master’s degree or higher (45.0
percent). Almost half of respondents held the position of Chief Audit Executive (48.7 percent),
with manager-level and senior-level respondents comprising 37.7 and 13.3 percent, respectively.
Almost all respondents (92.7 percent) are employed by publicly traded companies, and a similar
percentage of respondents (89.7 percent) engage in both compliance and consulting duties. A
majority of respondents (78.0 percent) indicated that at their organizations, internal auditors had
moved into management positions. Respondents indicated that, on average, 28 percent of internal
auditors within their departments were currently being groomed for management positions.
When included as covariates, none of the demographic variables were significant. Therefore,
demographic variables are not included as covariates in subsequent analyses.
To determine whether randomization had been achieved, MTG and fraud size were
included as independent variables in a MANOVA model, with the aforementioned demographic
variables included as dependent variables. A lack of significance for all demographic variables
was found, which provides some assurance that randomization was achieved.

______________________________________________________________________________
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TABLE 1
Participant Demographics
Panel A: Means and Standard Deviations
Variable
Age
Work Experience

n

Mean

SD

138

46.09

9.64

146

14.58

8.97

Panel B: Frequencies and Percentages
Variable

Response

n

Percent

Gender

Male
Female

91
56

68.9%
38.1%

Designation

CPA
CIA
CMA
CISA

99
72
4
31

63.1%
45.9%
2.5%
19.7%

Education

Associates
Bachelors
Some Graduate
Masters or Higher

1
70
12
68

0.7%
46.4%
7.9%
45.0%

Job Level

Entry-level
Senior-level
Manager-level
CAE

1
20
56
73

0.7%
13.3%
37.3%
48.7%

Type of Organization

Publicly-traded
Privately-held
Other

140
9
2

92.7%
6.0%
1.3%

Type of Duties

Compliance only
Consulting only
Both compliance
and consulting

15
0
131

10.3%
0.0%
89.7%
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Internal Auditors ever moved
to management positions at
your organization?

Yes
No
Don’t know

Percentage of Internal
Auditors in your department
currently being groomed for
management position?

117
31
2

78.0%
20.7%
1.3%
28.0% (mean)

Manipulation Checks
Two manipulation check questions were included in the post-experimental questionnaire
in order to verify the effectiveness of the manipulations. The first manipulation check question
asked participants to indicate which statement best characterizes Payton Landry’s career plans.
Two choices were provided: 1.) Landry is preparing to transfer into a senior management
position in the next few months, and 2.) Landry is planning to remain in internal audit
indefinitely. This question was included to ensure that participants are aware of the presence or
absence of the practice of using internal audit as a MTG. All 157 participants answered this
manipulation check question correctly. The second manipulation check question asked
participants to indicate the magnitude of the fraud committed by CFO Nathan Martin, and
answer choices are one percent and thirty percent. One participant (0.6 percent) answered this
manipulation check question incorrectly and was dropped from further analyses. The remaining
results reflect the 156 participants who passed both manipulation checks.7
Dependent Variables
The primary dependent variable of interest is the participant’s assessed likelihood that
Landry will report the fraud to his CAE. Participants respond on a scale from 0 percent (no
likelihood, definitely would not report) to 100 percent (high likelihood, definitely would report).
Descriptive statistics are summarized in Table 2. The highest mean reporting likelihood (91.35)
7

Results are unchanged when including the participant who failed the manipulation check.
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occurs when there is no management training ground and a large fraud. Conversely, the lowest
mean reporting likelihood (76.17) occurs when there is a MTG and a large fraud. In comparing
the means for the levels of fraud magnitude, there is little separation in reporting likelihood
between large and small frauds (83.89 for small fraud, and 82.86 for large fraud, p = 0.726).
However, in comparing the means for MTG, there is a notable difference between reporting
likelihood in the training ground condition (77.76) and the no training ground condition (90.00, p
< 0.001). Thus, based on the descriptive statistics, management training ground appears to have
an effect on reporting likelihood while fraud magnitude does not.

TABLE 2
Means (Std. Deviation) for Reporting Likelihooda

Fraud Magnitudec

Management Training Groundb
Training Ground
Training Ground
Absent
Present

Total

Small Fraud

88.53 (13.736)
n = 34

79.74 (22.116)
n = 38

83.89 (19.030)
n = 72

Large Fraud

91.35 (10.843)
n = 37

76.17 (18.830)
n = 47

82.86 (17.464)
n = 84

Total

90.00 (12.306)
n = 71

77.76 (20.318)
n = 85

a

The third-person likelihood of reporting the questionable act to CAE (ranging from 0 = “No Likelihood,
definitely would not report” to 100 = “High Likelihood, definitely would report”).
b

Management Training Ground = 1 if training ground present, 0 if training ground absent.

c

Fraud Magnitude = 1 if large fraud (30 percent of net income), 0 if small fraud (1 percent of net income).

Tests of Hypotheses and Research Questions
Hypothesis 1 examines the main effect of MTG on fraud reporting intentions.
Specifically, it predicts that internal auditors will be less likely to report a fraudulent act when
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the internal audit function is used as a MTG relative to when internal audit is not used as a MTG.
Hypothesis 2 examines the main effect of fraud magnitude on fraud reporting intentions.
Specifically, it predicts that reporting likelihood will be greater when fraud magnitude is large
relative to when fraud magnitude is small.
Hypothesis 1 and 2 are tested using univariate analysis of variance (general linear model).
The independent variables are MTG and fraud magnitude. The results are presented in Table 3.
As shown in Table 3, the main effect for MTG is significant, providing support for H1. This
finding suggests that internal auditors are significantly less likely to report a fraudulent act when
being groomed for a management position than when not being groomed for such a position. The
main effect for fraud magnitude is not significant, failing to support H2. Fraud magnitude
appears to have no significant effect on internal auditor reporting intentions in the current
context. This could be due to the competing motivations internal auditors have with regard to
reporting frauds of different magnitudes. As discussed previously, while fraud size is expected to
be positively associated with reporting intentions, as employees of the company internal auditors
may be incentivized to find and report smaller, less damaging frauds rather than larger, more
damaging frauds.
Hypothesis 3 predicts that perceived seriousness of the act will be greater when fraud
magnitude is large relative to when fraud magnitude is small. H3 was examined using an
independent samples t-test. Participants were asked to assess the level of seriousness of the act
on a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (“very low”) to 7 (“very high”). Results
(untabulated) indicate that participants perceived large frauds (mean = 6.92) to be more serious
than small frauds (mean = 6.49, t = 3.881, p < 0.001), thus supporting H3.
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Research Question 1 inquires how fraud magnitude and the use of internal audit as a
MTG impact internal auditors’ perceived responsibility to report the fraudulent act. Participants
were asked to assess the personal responsibility of Landry to report his findings to the CAE on a
7-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (“very low”) to 7 (“very high”). RQ1 was examined
using univariate analysis of variance (general linear model). The independent variables are MTG
and fraud magnitude. Results (untabulated) reveal a non-significant ANOVA model (p = 0.582).
Participants across all conditions rated the responsibility to report as very high. On the 7-point
scale, cell means ranged from 6.91 (small fraud, no training ground) to 6.97 (large fraud, no
training ground and small fraud, training ground present). Thus, participants indicated a very
strong belief that Landry has a personal responsibility to report the fraud to his CAE, regardless
of fraud size or use of the internal audit function as a MTG. When considered with the finding
for H1, this finding supports the economic incentive theory explanation of internal auditor
reporting behavior by suggesting that while internal auditors recognize their responsibility to
report the fraud in all conditions, they may display a reduced likelihood of reporting when being
groomed for a management position.

TABLE 3
Univariate Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) Effects of Fraud Magnitude and Management
Training Ground on the Reporting Likelihooda
Source
SS
Df
MS
F
p-valued
Mgt. Training Groundb
5524.677
1
5524.677
18.716
<0.001
c
Fraud Magnitude
5.331
1
5.331
0.018
0.893
Mgt. Training Ground *
1
392.323
1.329
0.251
Fraud Magnitude
392.323
Error
44866.910
152
295.177
n = 156; R2 = 0.121; Adj. R2 = 0.104; corrected model significance < .001
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a

The dependent variable is the third-person likelihood of reporting the questionable act to CAE (ranging from 0 =
“No Likelihood, definitely would not report” to 100 = “High Likelihood, definitely would report”).

b

Management Training Ground = 1 if training ground present, 0 if training ground absent

c

Fraud Magnitude = 1 if large fraud (30 percent of net income), 0 if small fraud (1 percent of net income).

d

All p-values are two-tailed.

Hypothesis 4 predicts that when the internal audit function is used as a MTG, the
perceived personal costs associated with reporting a large fraud will be higher than when internal
audit is not used as a MTG. Participants were asked to assess the likelihood that Landry would
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face personal costs if he reported the fraud to his CAE. Responses were on a 7-point Likert-type
scale ranging from 1 (“very unlikely”) to 7 (“very likely”). H4 was tested by examining the
effect of MTG on perceived personal costs for the “large fraud” subset of data. Results of the
one-way ANOVA model are presented in Table 4. While the means are in the hypothesized
direction (MTG absent = 3.08, MTG present = 3.34) the mean difference is not statistically
significant (p = 0.57). Thus, H4 is not supported. This could be due to the fact that internal
auditors, whether being groomed for a management position or not, face similar costs if a large
fraud is discovered. Specifically, a large and potentially damaging fraud could jeopardize the
positions of all internal auditors, not just those being groomed for a management position.

TABLE 4
One-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) Effect of Management Training Ground on Perceived
Personal Costsa in the Large Fraud Condition
Source
SS
Df
MS
F
p-value
b
Between Groups
1.392
1
1.392
0.320
0.573
Within Groups
357.310
82
4.357
Total
358.702
83
n = 84
a
The dependent variable is the perceived likelihood that Landry will face personal costs if he reports the fraud
(ranging from 1 = “Very Unlikely” to 7 = “Very Likely”).
b

Management Training Ground = 1 if training ground present, 0 if training ground absent

Research Question 2 inquires whether the effect of MTG on reporting intentions is
exacerbated for individuals who score high on Machiavellianism. Machiavellianism was
measured using a 10-item scale developed by Allsopp et al. (1991) and validated by Mudrack
and Mason (1995). Reliability of the scale was sufficient and comparable to extant literature
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(Cronbach’s alpha = .712). Each of the 10 items was measured on a 7-point scale, providing a
maximum score of 70 with higher scores indicating higher levels of Machiavellianism.
A total of 145 internal auditors completed the 10-item Machiavellianism scale. Scores
ranged from 10 to 36, with a mean score of 16.21. Christie and Geis (1970) define high-Machs as
those who score higher than 100 on the Mach-IV scale, which is measured using 20 items, each
with a 7-point scale. In applying this standard to the 10-item Allsopp et al. (1991) scale, highMachs would be defined as those scoring higher than 50. In the current study, none of the
participants scored higher than 50, and only two scored higher than the mid-point of 35.
Therefore, Research Question 2 is examined by splitting the sample into two groups based on the
median Machiavellianism score. The median Machiavellianism score is 15. Splitting the sample
based on scores below 15 and scores of 15 and above resulted in almost equivalent groups.
RQ2 was examined using univariate analysis of variance (general linear model). The
independent variables are MTG and an indicator variable capturing Machiavellianism (1 = score
at median or above; 0 = below median). As shown in Table 5, results indicate no significant main
effect for Machiavellianism and no significant interaction (p = 0.81 and p = 0.38, respectively).
This implies that the impact of MTG on fraud reporting intentions is not contingent on the
individual’s Machiavellianism score.8 This result is not surprising considering that none of the
internal auditor respondents qualified as high-Machs.

8

The impact of Machiavellianism score was also evaluated using OLS Regression. When Machiavellianism is
included as the sole independent variable, results reveal no significant effect on reporting intentions (p = 0.277).
Similarly, when Machiavellianism score is included as an independent variable with MTG and fraud magnitude,
results reveal no significant effect on reporting intentions (p = 0.220). Further, when Machiavellianism score was
added as a continuous covariate to an ANCOVA model with third-person reporting intentions as the dependent
variable and with MTG and fraud magnitude as the independent variables, results are unchanged from the primary
analysis. Specifically, MTG remains significant while Machiavellianism and fraud magnitude do not.
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TABLE 5
Univariate Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) Effects of Machiavellianism and Management
Training Ground on the Reporting Likelihooda
Source
SS
Df
MS
F
p-valued
Mgt. Training Groundb
5632.969
1
5632.969
18.972
0.000
c
Machiavellianism
17.074
1
17.074
0.058
0.811
Mgt. Training Ground *
Machiavellianism
228.231
1
228.231
0.769
0.382
Error
41864.265
141
296.910
n = 145; R2 = 0.123; Adj. R2 = 0.105
a
The dependent variable is the third-person likelihood of reporting the questionable act to CAE (ranging from 0 =
“No Likelihood, definitely would not report” to 100 = “High Likelihood, definitely would report”).
b

Management Training Ground = 1 if training ground present, 0 if training ground absent

c

Machiavellianism = 1 if at median score (15) or above, 0 if below median score.

d

All p-values are two-tailed.

Supplemental Analyses
Social Desirability Bias
While the primary dependent variable of interest is the third-person reporting intentions,
first-person reporting intentions were also captured in order to measure social desirability bias.
Social desirability bias refers to the tendency for participants to represent themselves favorably
on a survey instrument by underestimating (overestimating) the probability they would engage in
an undesirable (desirable) action (e.g., Chung and Monroe 2003). The most direct test of social
desirability bias is to reproduce the primary analyses using first-person rather than third-person
responses and noting any differences in the results. As shown in Tables 6 and 7, results using
first-person responses reflect clear evidence of social desirability bias, as well as a ceiling effect.
All means are near the scale maximum of 100, with the lowest mean at 97.35 (see Table 6). In
other words, nearly all participants indicated they would self-report the fraud, regardless of fraud
size or MTG. As shown in Table 7 and in contrast to the results in Table 3, the ANOVA model
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was not significant (p = 0.246). In summary, the results using first-person responses indicate
evidence of social desirability bias.

TABLE 6
Means (Std. Deviation) for Reporting Likelihood- first-persona

Fraud Magnitudec

Management Training Groundb
Training Ground
Training Ground
Absent
Present

Total

Small Fraud

97.35 (6.656)
n = 34

99.47 (2.263)
n = 38

98.47 (4.939)
n = 72

Large Fraud

98.65 (4.191)
n = 37

97.87 (5.080)
n = 47

98.21 (4.698)
n = 84

Total

98.03 (5.508)
n = 71

98.59 (4.127)
n = 85

a

The first-person likelihood of reporting the questionable act to CAE (ranging from 0 = “No Likelihood,
definitely would not report” to 100 = “High Likelihood, definitely would report”).
b

Management Training Ground = 1 if training ground present, 0 if training ground absent.

c

Fraud Magnitude = 1 if large fraud (30 percent of net income), 0 if small fraud (1 percent of net income).

TABLE 7
Univariate Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) Effects of Fraud Magnitude and Management
Training Ground on the Reporting Likelihood- first-persona
Source
SS
df
MS
F
p-valued
Mgt. Training Groundb
17.375
1
17.375
0.761
0.384
c
Fraud Magnitude
0.898
1
0.898
0.039
0.843
Mgt. Training Ground *
Fraud Magnitude
80.677
1
80.677
3.533
0.062
Error
3470.905
152
22.835
n = 156; R2 = 0.027; Adj. R2 = 0.008; corrected model significance = .246
a
The dependent variable is the first-person likelihood of reporting the questionable act to CAE (ranging from 0 =
“No Likelihood, definitely would not report” to 100 = “High Likelihood, definitely would report”).
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b

Management Training Ground = 1 if training ground present, 0 if training ground absent

c

Fraud Magnitude = 1 if large fraud (30 percent of net income), 0 if small fraud (1 percent of net income).

d

All p-values are two-tailed.

Urgency to Report
Participants were also asked to indicate the perceived level of urgency Landry feels to
report his findings. This question was included as a supplement to the primary dependent
variable in order to assess the strength of the compulsion to report. As shown in Table 8 and
Figure 2, results reveal significant main effects for MTG (p = 0.011) and fraud magnitude (p =
0.014) and a marginally significant interaction (p = 0.081). Specifically, as the interaction
reveals, respondents indicated higher levels of urgency to report when the fraud was large and
when the internal audit function was not used as a MTG.
Two additional analyses were conducted to examine the marginally significant
interaction. First, a contrast test was conducted to determine whether the mean urgency to report
a large fraud in the absence of a MTG is statistically different from the other three conditions.
Results (untabulated) reveal a significant contrast (F3, 149 = 5.291, p = 0.002) and also reveal that
this mean is statistically different from the other three conditions. Since urgency to report was
not a hypothesized variable and thus the contrast was not planned a priori, a more conservative
Tukey’s post-hoc test was also conducted. As in the contrast test, results (untabulted) reveal that
mean urgency to report for the no MTG, large fraud condition is statistically different from the
other three conditions at the .05 level.
Therefore, as shown in Figure 2 and supported by a contrast test and Tukey’s post-hoc
test, having a MTG reduces the reporting urgency associated with large frauds to levels
statistically equivalent (at .05 level) to small frauds. Stated differently, in terms of urgency to
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report, having a MTG feature appears to cause internal auditors to view a large fraud (30 percent
of net income) as though it were a small fraud (one percent of net income). Conversely, when no
MTG was present, internal auditors indicated a relatively strong sense of urgency to report a
large fraud. These results suggest that using the internal audit function as a MTG inhibits the
sense of urgency internal auditors feel to report fraudulent acts. Most concerning, the interaction
suggests that the MTG feature particularly reduces the perceived urgency to report large frauds.

TABLE 8
Univariate Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) Effects of Fraud Magnitude and Management
Training Ground on the Perceived Urgency to Reporta
Source
SS
Df
MS
F
p-valued
Mgt. Training Groundb
13.096
1
13.096
6.655
0.011
c
Fraud Magnitude
12.255
1
12.255
6.228
0.014
Mgt. Training Ground *
1
6.076
3.088
0.081
Fraud Magnitude
6.076
Error
293.208
149
1.968
n = 153; R2 = 0.096; Adj. R2 = 0.078; corrected model significance = .002
a
The dependent variable is the perceived urgency that Landry will feel to report the fraud (ranging from 1 = “No
Urgency” to 7 = “Substantial Urgency”).
b

Management Training Ground = 1 if training ground present, 0 if training ground absent

c

Fraud Magnitude = 1 if large fraud (30 percent of net income), 0 if small fraud (1 percent of net income).

d

All p-values are two-tailed.
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V. SUMMARY, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH
The primary purpose of this dissertation is to examine the effects of MTG and fraud
magnitude on internal auditor fraud reporting intentions. Prior research documents negative
repercussions due to the reduced internal auditor objectivity associated with using the internal
audit function as a training ground for management (e.g., Rose et al. 2013; Hoos et al. 2013;
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Messier et al. 2011). This study investigates whether the objectivity threats can extend to the
internal auditor’s fraud reporting decision.
Using a 2x2 experiment that manipulates the use of the internal audit functions as a MTG
(used as a training ground vs. not used as a training ground) and fraud magnitude (large fraud,
defined as 30 percent of net income vs. small fraud, defined as one percent of net income), this
study finds that respondents indicate a lower likelihood that a discovered fraud will be reported
when the internal auditor is being groomed for a management position. No effect is found for
fraud magnitude, as internal auditors appear equally likely to report large and small frauds in this
context. However, supplemental analysis suggests that having a MTG feature reduces the
urgency internal auditors feel to report fraudulent acts. Most concerning, these results indicate
that using the internal audit function as a MTG reduces internal auditors’ perceived urgency to
report a large fraud so severely that urgency levels become statistically equivalent to those
observed in the small fraud condition. In the absence of a MTG, internal auditors indicate a much
greater sense of perceived urgency to report a large fraud. Together, these results suggest that
using the internal audit function as a MTG can obstruct internal auditors from completing one of
their major duties: reporting fraud in a timely manner.
This dissertation also examines factors underlying the fraud reporting decision as
modeled by Schultz et al. (1993). Not surprisingly, participants perceived large frauds to be more
serious than small frauds. In addition, participants indicated a strong belief that the internal
auditor has a personal responsibility to report fraud, regardless of fraud magnitude or use of the
internal audit function as a MTG. Finally, no relation is found between MTG use and perceived
personal costs.
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Finally, this dissertation examines the impact of Machiavellianism on internal auditor
fraud reporting intentions. Results reveal no high-Mach internal auditors in the sample and
suggest that the impact of MTG on fraud reporting intentions is not contingent on the
individual’s Machiavellianism score.
This study leverages the benefits of the experimental method to isolate the effects of
MTG and fraud magnitude on reporting intentions. The research question would have been
difficult to address using archival methods. An experiment allows for the control of confounding
effects, which increases internal validity. However, a limitation of this study and all experimental
studies is external validity. For this reason, extensive care was taken to make sure the
experimental scenario was realistic. Specifically, meetings with internal auditors and pilot tests
using internal auditors helped to ensure the realism of the hypothetical case. A related limitation
of this study is experimental realism. While the case was designed to be realistic, the
experimental setting is far more simplified than the real-world context internal auditors face.
Thus, responses to the experimental scenario may not reflect what internal auditors would do in a
more complex, real-world environment. For this reason, and due to evidence of social
desirability bias, third-person responses are used as the primary dependent variable.
Notwithstanding these limitations, this study offers several contributions to the literature.
First, while this study examines the impact of using internal audit as a MTG on fraud reporting
intentions, it provides insight into the more general area of how incentives impact internal
auditor objectivity with regard to fraud reporting. This study is the first to experimentally
document that internal auditor objectivity threats associated with the use of a MTG can extend to
the fraud reporting decision. Second, this study reveals an interesting and counterintuitive
finding associated with fraud magnitude. In this setting, internal auditors were no more likely to
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report a large fraud (30 percent of net income) than a small fraud (one percent of net income).
This result was unexpected and solicits future research. Third, this study examines the impact of
Machiavellianism on internal auditor fraud reporting intentions. While no relation is found
between Machiavellianism and fraud reporting intentions, it is informative to note the simple
descriptive finding that no internal auditors in the sample were high-Machs. Fourth, this study
provides insight into which of two theories may be at work in the relation between MTG and
fraud reporting intentions. Specifically, it appears that internal auditors are fully aware of their
responsibility to report all fraud, but may be less willing to report fraud in the presence of a
MTG. This supports the economic incentive theory explanation and corroborates the proposition
in Koonce (2013). Finally, the results provide experimental evidence to corroborate the IIA’s
concern about the ethical compass of internal auditors.
Future research could extend the results of this study in several ways. This study tested
two rather extreme levels of fraud (one percent of net income and thirty percent of net income)
and found no significant effect of fraud magnitude on reporting intentions. Future research could
examine different, perhaps more moderate fraud magnitudes to see if there is an association
between fraud magnitude and internal auditor reporting intentions. Also, future research could
continue to investigate the extent to which internal auditor behavior is explained by motivated
reasoning theory vs. economic incentive theory. Both theories are credited for explaining the
behavior of internal auditors in the face of objectivity threats. Future research could examine
which theory has greater explanatory power. Finally, future research could examine the reporting
intentions of those internal auditors who have not been chosen for a potential management
position. It would be interesting to examine how internal auditors respond to knowledge that
their peers have been chosen to participate in a MTG but they have not. Considering the
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prevalence of MTG usage, it is important to understand how a MTG impacts those internal
auditors who are not being groomed for management positions.
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Appendix A
Thank you for participating in this study. On the next screen you will read a brief scenario and then
answer a few questions about your reactions to the scenario.
Associated Materials Inc. Overview
Action Manufacturing Inc. (AMI) is a manufacturer of industrial grade plastics. Formed in 1982, AMI
employs approximately 3,200 people in its plants and trades on the New York Stock Exchange. Since
AMI is a publicly traded company, it is required to file quarterly reports (10Q) and an annual report (10K)
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The financial results for the past several years
indicate that AMI has produced steady profits, but beginning three years ago AMI’s revenues fell to
levels below that of key industry competitors.
Payton Landry is a senior internal auditor at AMI. Landry has worked as an internal auditor at AMI for
two years, and is planning to remain in internal audit indefinitely. Landry plans to be a career
internal auditor [preparing to transfer into a senior management position in the next few months.
Landry has worked in internal audit as part of a management training program]. His
responsibilities as senior internal auditor include evaluating internal controls, operating efficiency,
regulatory compliance, and testing various financial statement accounts.
One evening Landry was working late and happened to uncover what appeared to be improper journal
entries hidden deep in a chain of erroneously referenced subsidiary ledgers. The entries classified certain
items as assets rather than expenses. Landry noted that the same items had been expensed historically
until three years ago when the company’s revenue began falling behind industry competitors. After
thoroughly investigating the entries, Landry was fairly confident that the CFO, Nathan Martin, had
engaged in an unethical act of misreporting financial information. These entries had the effect of
increasing net income by 30%. Landry knows that a fraud of this magnitude could lead to
significantly negative reputational and financial effects for AMI [1%. Landry knows that a fraud of
this magnitude would likely not lead to significantly negative reputational and financial effects for
AMI].
Landry is fairly certain that Martin intentionally and inappropriately changed the expense classification.
Landry is also confident that neither the internal nor the external auditors will find the misstatement, as
the entries were buried in subsidiary journals and were in amounts that would fall below the materiality
threshold. Furthermore, the internal and external auditors had not discovered the inappropriate entries
during the last three years. Landry feels certain that he is the only person aware of Martin’s possible
fraudulent activities over this three-year period.
Under AMI’s internal audit department protocol, Landry is to report these findings to his supervisor, the
Chief Audit Executive (CAE). As Landry ponders the situation, he considers the implications of reporting
and the potential impact on both AMI and his career.
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1. How likely do you think it is that Landry will report this instance of questionable behavior to the
CAE?
0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

No Likelihood
(Definitely would
not report)

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

Moderate
Likelihood

100%
High Likelihood
(Definitely would
report)

2. If you were in Landry’s position, how likely is it that you would report this instance of questionable
behavior to the CAE?
0%

10%

20%

30%

No Likelihood
(Definitely would
not report)

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

Moderate
Likelihood

100%
High Likelihood
(Definitely would
report)

3. Please indicate the seriousness (i.e., the amount of harm done) of the questionable act described in the
case:
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Very
Low

Moderately
Low

Slightly
Low

Neutral

Slightly
High

Moderately
High

Very
High

4. Please assess the personal responsibility (duty or obligation) of Landry to report his findings to the
internal audit CAE:
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Very
Low

Moderately
Low

Slightly
Low

Neutral

Slightly
High

Moderately
High

Very
High

5. How likely do you think it is that there would be personal costs (i.e., demotion, job loss) for Landry if
he reports his findings to the CAE?
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Very
Unlikely

Moderately
Unlikely

Slightly
Unlikely

Neutral

Slightly Likely

Moderately
Likely

Very
Likely

6. How likely do you think it is that Landry would face retaliation if he reports his findings to the CAE?
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Very
Unlikely

Moderately
Unlikely

Slightly
Unlikely

Neutral

Slightly Likely

Moderately
Likely

Very
Likely
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7. How likely do you think it is that there would be personal benefits for Landry if he reports his
findings to the CAE?
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Very
Unlikely

Moderately
Unlikely

Slightly
Unlikely

Neutral

Slightly Likely

Moderately
Likely

Very
Likely

8. According to the case, which of the following characterizes Landry’s career plans?
_______ Landry is preparing to transfer into a senior management position in the next few months
_______ Landry is planning to remain in internal audit indefinitely
9. According to the case, what size was the suspected fraud committed by CFO Nathan Martin?
_______ 1% of net income
_______ 30% of net income

10. Please indicate how certain you feel that Martin engaged in a wrongful act.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Very
Uncertain

Moderately
Uncertain

Slightly
Uncertain

Neutral

Slightly
Certain

Moderately
Certain

Very
Certain

11. Please indicate the extent to which you believe the questionable act described in the case is morally
wrong:
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Very
Low

Moderately
Low

Slightly
Low

Neutral

Slightly
High

Moderately
High

Very
High

12. How likely do you think it is that there would be negative repercussions for AMI if the fraud is
reported?
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Very
Unlikely

Moderately
Unlikely

Slightly
Unlikely

Neutral

Slightly
Likely

Moderately
Likely

Very
Likely

13. How likely do you think it is that there would be negative repercussions for Landry if he chooses not
to report the fraud?
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Very
Unlikely

Moderately
Unlikely

Slightly
Unlikely

Neutral

Slightly Likely

Moderately
Likely

Very
Likely
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14. How much urgency do you think Landry feels to report his findings?
1

2

3

4

No
Urgency

5

6

Moderate
Urgency

7
Substantial
Urgency

15. Based on the information provided in the case, do you think Landry identifies more with the internal
audit department or senior management?
1

2

3

4

Identifies only
with Internal
Audit

5

6

Identifies with
both Internal
Audit and
Senior
Management

7
Identifies only
with Senior
Management

Please read and answer each question below:
16. Would you be prepared to deceive someone completely if it was to your advantage to do so?
1

2

3

4

No

5

6

Neutral

7
Yes

17. Would you be prepared to do a bad turn to someone in order to get something you particularly wanted
for yourself?
1

2

3

4

No

5

6

Neutral

7
Yes

18. Do you often act in a cunning way in order to get what you want?
1

2

3

4

No

5

6

Neutral

7
Yes

19. Would you be prepared to “walk all over people” to get what you want?
1

2

3

4

No

5

6

Neutral

7
Yes

20. Do you enjoy manipulating people?
1

2

3

4

No

5

6

Neutral

7
Yes

21. Do you tend to do most things with an eye to your own advantage?
1

2

3

4

No

Neutral
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5

6

7
Yes

22. Do you agree that the most important thing in life is winning?
1

2

3

4

No

5

6

Neutral

7
Yes

23. Would you be prepared to be quite ruthless in order to get ahead in your job?
1

2

3

4

No

5

6

Neutral

7
Yes

24. *Would you prefer to be humble and honest rather than important and dishonest?
1

2

3

4

No

5

6

Neutral

7
Yes

25. Would you like to be very powerful?
1

2

3

4

No

5

6

Neutral

(*the item marked with * is reverse-scored)

26. Background questions
Do you hold any of the following designations? (Check all that apply)
_____ CPA _____ CIA _____ CMA ____CISA ____________________ other (please specify)
27. Highest level of education completed:
Associates Degree _____
Bachelors Degree _____
Some Graduate School _____
Masters Degree or Higher _____

28. Current Job Level (please check one): _______Entry-level ______Lead/Senior
_____Supervisor/Manager _____ Chief Audit Executive (CAE)

29. In which type of organization do you currently work as an internal auditor?
_____ Publicly-held company _____ Privately-held company _____ Governmental _____ Not-for-profit
_____Other (please specify)__________________________
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7
Yes

30. What type of duties do you perform as an internal auditor?
_____ Compliance only _____ Consulting only _____ Both compliance and consulting
_____ Other (please specify ) _________________________
31. At your organization, have any internal auditors ever moved into management positions?
_____ Yes _____ No _____ Don’t know
32. Approximately what percentage of internal auditors in your organization are currently being groomed
for a management position?
0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

33. Please indicate your gender:

34. What is your age?

50%

60%

70%

________ Male

80%

90%

100%

________ Female

__________

35. How many years have you been an internal auditor? __________________

36. How often do you think internal auditors hide fraud from external auditors?
1

2

3

Never

4

5

6

7

Occasionally

Often

37. Have you ever felt pressure to find small errors/wrongdoings while overlooking large
errors/wrongdoings (to protect the company)?
1

2

3

No

4

5

6

7

Neutral

Yes

38. Have you ever encountered other internal auditors who believe it is acceptable to hide wrongdoings
(to protect the company)?
1
Never

2

3

4

5

6

7

Occasionally

39. Have you ever discovered a person engaging in fraudulent behavior? ______ Yes
40. Have you ever reported wrongdoing? _______ Yes

______ No

THANK YOU FOR PARTICIPATING! Feel free to leave any comments below
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Often

______ No
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